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THE EFFECT OF A PARDON ON LICENSE REVOCATION AND
REINSTATMENT
Conviction of a felony or a crime involving moral turpitude is perhaps
the most common ground for license revocation in California. Some of the
governing sections of the California Business and Professions Code provide
that the felony must be related to the particular occupation in which the
licensee is engaged,' but most provide for revocation upon conviction of any
felony or crime involving moral turpitude.2 This note investigates the right
to reinstatement of one who has received a pardon for the offense which
formed the basis of his license revocation.
History and Effect of Pardon
The power to pardon a convicted felon can be traced to the power of a
father to punish or forgive. With the advent of community life, this familial
power was transferred to the communal leader, becoming eventually an un-
limited power in the hands of the sovereign. In England, the crown utilized
the power to pardon in time of war to enhance its military strength and also
to curry the favor of lords with friends in need of a pardon. Pardons were
also granted upon the payment of money, in celebration of feast days, or
upon changes in social conditions (amnesty). In short, the pardoning power
was subject to no restrictions. Pardons were often used to avoid the rigid
requirements of the law. They might have been granted to minors, insane
persons, or those claiming self-defense in homicide cases. Such situations
are now provided for by law, but that was not always the case.3
The power to pardon usually resides in the chief executive who holds
a position analogous to that formerly held by the sovereign. The pardoning
power of the crown was unlimited because the crown was the source of all
power.4 In a democracy, however, sovereignty rests in the people who in
turn may delegate powers as they see fit.5 For this reason, the people may
vest any governmental agency with the pardoning power or they may dis-
pense with it altogether. Today, the pardoning power of the chief executive
remains virtually unlimited." A governor may still grant pardons at his dis-
cretion, but an abuse of his power need not go unredressed.7 Pardons even
I E.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 1320(k) (clinical laboratory technicians), 2555.1
(dispensing opticians), 5577 (architects), 5675 (landscape architects).
2 E.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 3094 (optometrists), 2685(d) (physical thera-
pists, 2761(f) (nurses), 6576 (barbers), 7211.9(d) (trainers of guide dogs for the
blind), 7431(j) (cosmetologists).
3For a complete study of the history of pardon see 3 ArroRNEY GmxqExa's SUv=-
oF RELEAsE PaocED o 1-53 (1939).
4Id. at 88 (citing LmBER, Cnvm LmERTY An SELF-Cov mr~mrm, appendix II,
A Paper on the Abuse of the Pardoning Power 433).
5Id. at 87-88; Jamison v. Flanner, 116 Kan. 624, 634, 228 Pac. 82, 87 (1924).
6 In California, the pardoning power of the Governor is found in CAL. CONsr. art.
VII, § 1. This power is limited only in treason and impeachment cases, and if one has
been twice convicted of a felony the approval of a majority of the Supreme Court of
California is required.
7 See 3 ATrosuEY GENERAL'S Sua= OF RFrEAsE PRoc murE 150-53 (1939), re-
garding the impeachment of Governor Walton of Oklahoma.
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today are exercised "to dispose of cases where the legal rules have produced
a harsh, unjust, or popularly unacceptable result."8 They are also used as
release procedures in some states, especially for reasons of innocence.9
The effect of a pardon has been variously defined. The United States
Supreme Court in Ex Parte Garland ° stated: "[Wihen the pardon is full, it
releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the
eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the
offense."" On the other hand, some California cases have stated that a
pardon implies guilt and does not erase the fact of the commission of the
crime or the conviction, nor wash out the moral stain; nor does it restore
offices forfeited in consequence of conviction.1 2
Varying interpretations of the effect of a pardon result from the failure
of the courts to distinguish between the reasons for which the pardon was
granted.13 A pardon for innocence is an acquittal, and must be given all
the effects of an acquittal. "A pardon for other reasons is not an acquittal;
it leaves the determination of the convict's guilt stand, and only relieves him
from the legal consequences of that guilt." 4 Thus the statement in Garland is
too broad and should be limited to only those pardons granted for innocence.'5
Effect of Penal Code Section 4853
In California the effect of a pardon has been codified in Penal Code
section 4853,0 a loosely written provision which has never been adequately
8 Weihofen, Pardon: An Extraordinary Remedy, 12 RoCKY Mr. L. REV. 112, 120
(1940).
9 Professor Weihofen argues that the use of a pardon as a release procedure usurps
the function of parole; and that in instances of innocent persons, the case should be re-
opened and a reversal of the wrongful conviction entered. Id. at 112-20.
1071 U.S. 333 (1866).
11 Id. at 380.
12E.g., People v. Briggs, 9 Cal. 2d 508, 71 P.2d 214 (1937); People v. Dutton, 9
Cal. 2d 505, 71 P.2d 218 (1937); In re Lavine, 2 Cal. 2d 324, 41 P.2d 161 (1935).
3. See Weihofen, The Effect of Pardon, 88 U. PA. L. REv. 177 (1939).
14 Id. at 179.
15 The pardon removes all legal punishment for the offense. Therefore if the
mere conviction involves certain disqualifications which would not follow from
the commission of the crime without conviction, the pardon removes such dis-
qualifications. On the other hand, if character is a necessary qualification and
the commission of a crime would disqualify even though there had been no
criminal prosecution for the crime, the fact that the criminal has been convicted
and pardoned does not make him any more eligible.
Williston, Does a Pardon Blot Out Guilt? 28 Hazv. L. REv. 647, 653 (1915). Professor
Weihofen contends this is the correct rule if applied only to pardons not granted for
innocence. Weihofen, supra note 13, at 178.
16 [I]t shall .. .restore . .. all rights, privileges, and franchises of which he
has been deprived . . .provided, that nothing herein contained shall abridge
... the power... conferred by law on any board ... to revoke or suspend
any such right, privilege or franchise for any act or omission not involved in
said conviction; ... nothing in this article shall affect any of the provisions of
the Medical Practice Act . . .or the power . . . conferred by law upon any
board that issues a certificate which permits any person . .. to apply his . ..
art or profession on the person of another.
CAL. PEN. CODE, § 4853.
THE HASTINGS L.AW JOURNAL [Vol. 15
judicially interpreted. The provision restores all the "rights, franchises, and
privileges of which the pardonee has been deprived in consequence of said
conviction." This broad statement, standing alone, could lend itself to the
interpretation that a licensee's reinstatement is concomitant with the pardon.
Moreover, the section makes no reference to licensees other than to deny
the right to reinstatement to those licensed under the Medical Practice Act
and to those who apply their "art or profession on the person of another."
It is doubtful whether the specific references of the section denying the
right of reinstatement to certain licensees can be construed to give this right
to all other licensees. A possible interpretation is that since the pardon does
not eradicate the guilt, it alone is not indicative that the pardonee has been
purged of the moral deficiency inherent in his conviction and for which his
license was revoked, and that there was therefore no intention to restore him
to his occupational status on the basis of the pardon alone. Under this inter-
pretation, the specific references are superfluous.
Certificate of Rehabilitation
Subsequent to the passage of section 4853,17 chapter 3.518 was added to
the Penal Code. This chapter provides a procedure whereby a felon may
acquire a pardon based upon a certificate of rehabilitation. After release
from a state prison and upon evidence of a three-year period of exemplary
conduct since his release, the convicted felon may fie for a certificate of
rehabilitation. 9 Upon receipt of the certificate, the governor may grant a
full pardon.20 Under section 4852.15 the pardonee receives not only the
benefits of the ordinary pardon2' but additional benefits as well. These in-
clude the right to possess firearms 22 and dispensation from impeachment as
a witness on the basis of conviction of a felony.2 3 These additional benefits
indicate an intention to rehabilitate reformed felons into useful citizens. 24
However, section 4852.15 is on its face even more restrictive in its treatment
of licensees than section 4853, and specifically denies the right to reinstate-
ment to attorneys and all licenses, including those licensed under the Medical
Practice Act and those who apply their "art or profession on the person of
another."25
17 Cal. Stat. 1941, ch. 106 § 15, p. 1129, based on Cal. Stat. 1933, ch. 945 § 1,
p. 2476.
18 Cal. Stat. 1943, ch. 400 § 1, p. 1922; CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 4852.01-.2.
19 CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 4852.01, 4852.03, 4852.05. A step by step account of the pro-
cedure may be found in MacGregor, Adult Probation, Parole, and Pardon in California,
38 TEXAS L. REv. 887, 907 (1960).
20 CAL. PEN. CODE § 4852.16.
21 See CAL. PEN. CODE § 4853.
22 Unless convicted of a felony involving the use of a dangerous weapon, CAL. PEN.
CODE § 4852.17; 28 Ops. CAL. ATr'Y GN. 178 (1956).23See CAL. CODE Crv. Pnoc. § 2051.
24 "It would seem ... that the act is a forward step in our system of penology, and
that it will be of significant benefit to men who have made their mistake and subse-
quently have proved their inclination and ability to become constructive members of
society." Mosk, Certificate of Rehabilitation and the New Pardon Procedure, 18 CAL.
S. B.An J. 172, 175 (1943).25
"Nothing . . . shall be construed to . .. require the reinstatement of the right
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With the certificate of rehabilitation a new type of pardon has been intro-
duced.26 It is not merely another release procedure, usurping the function of
parole, because by its very terms it is only available to one who has been
released from a state prison.2 7 It is not granted at the governor's discretion,
but only upon approval of a superior court and upon fulfillment of the stated
requirements laid down by the chapter. The pardon gained by the certifi-
cate is, then, a pardon falling somewhere between a normal (discretionary)
pardon, and a pardon granted for innocence. It is therefore anomalous that
the restrictions on the effect of this new type of pardon are more inclusive
than those under the traditional pardon. Certainly, those professionals who
work in a position of trust or confidence with the public should be expected
to conform to rigid standards of conduct. But to place all licensees in this
category and preclude them from pursuing their chosen occupations merely
because they are licensees defeats the purpose of the certificate of rehabili-
tation.
Effect on Reinstatement
Under present procedure, reinstatement is granted in the discretion of
each licensing board.28 This discretion is broad, and if the particular occu-
pation is striving for public respect or seeking to limit competition, 29 the
board may well be niggardly with reinstatements. Prior to 1961, the indi-
vidual agencies were empowered to appoint their own hearing officers.30
This resulted in an undesirable commingling of the hearing function with
that of fact finding.3 ' This defect was remedied in 1961, by the transfer to
the Division of Administrative Procedure of all hearing officers formerly
attached to the various agencies.3 2 However, decisions of hearing officers
remain subject to ratification by the particular board involved. A further
or privilege to practice or carry on any profession... the practice... of which requires
the possession .. . of- a license .... " CAL. PEN. CODE § 4852.15.
28 "[A] totally new procedure ...... Mosk, supra note 24, at 172.
27 CAL. PEN. CODE § 4852.01.
28 See CAL. Gov. CODE §§ 11512, 11517; Hohreiter v. Garrison, 81 Cal. App. 2d
384, 184 P.2d 323 (1947).
290 Ostensibly, licensing legislation is for the benefit and welfare of the public. How-
ever in most instances the impetus for such legislation comes from the profession and not
the public. The profession's prime goal is often to limit competition, raise the income of
its members, or gain respect. See generally, CouNcr. OF STATE Govrm umurs, Occu-
PATIONAL LICENSING LEGISLATION IN THE STATES (1952). "Some analyses imply that
self-interest is the only or primary motive impelling members of the occupation in this
desire for legislation." Id. at 57.
30 See CAL. Gov. CODE § 11502 as added by Cal. Stat. 1945, ch. 867, § 1, p. 1627.
31 Even though administrative agencies retaining staff hearing officers were
meticulous in removing staff hearing officers from investigation and prosecution,
which is far from the case in several agencies, the fact that the hearing officer
is an employee of the investigating and prosecuting agency, with the attendant
control over ... promotion ... pay. . . layoff ... are sufficient . . . to instill
into such hearing officers enough desire to please the agency and to adopt an
institutionalized approach which cannot help but reflect itself into some fact
finding processes.
Report of the Senate Interim Committee on Administrative Regulations and Adjudica-
tions 17, 1 APPENDIX, SENATE JouRNAL (1959).
3S See CAL. Coy. CODE § 11502 as added by Cal. Stat. 1961, ch. 2048 § 10, p. 4269.
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improvement could be made by removing the power of reinstatement from
the individual boards and placing it with the court having cognizance over
the granting of the certificate of rehabilitation. The decision would be based
upon the report submitted by the investigating officer that prepared the cer-
tificate of rehabilitation. One or more representatives from the occupation
in which the petitioner seeks reinstatement could be appointed to work with
the court and investigating officer on each case. By this means the petitioner
could be reinstated to his occupation at the time he receives his executive
pardon.
No cases have been found involving a licensee seeking reinstatement
under the Administrative Procedure Act3 after receipt of a pardon based
on the certificate of rehabilitation. However, two cases3 4 in which attorneys
were denied reinstatement after receiving this new type of pardon have
given rise to vigorous dissents by Justice Carter; he pointed out that "it is
not like the ordinary pardon where the motive or basis may be merely sym-
pathy or forgiveness."5
Conclusion
The difficulty arises from the fact that there are actually three types of
pardon available in California: those granted under the certificate of re-
habilitation, those granted for innocence, and those granted for other reasons.
The latter two types of pardon are both subject to Penal Code section 4853.
In failing to distinguish between the two types of pardon, both innocent and
culpable pardonees may be deprived of the right to pursue their occupations
under this section, although it is clear that the innocent pardonee should be
entitled to reinstatement of his license.
In contrast to the pardon governed by section 4853, the certificate of
rehabilitation represents a new type of pardon. Unfortunately the statutory
provisions governing the traditional pardon have not only been trans-
planted"° to the certificate of rehabilitation, but have been broadened and
now expressly encompass all licensees. The result, of course, is to eliminate
one of the most useful purposes of the certificate-that of permitting one,
upon rehabilitation, to pursue his chosen occupation. The pardon granted
on the certificate is available only to those deemed worthy. Such a pardon
should carry great weight in a reinstatement proceeding, whereas a pardon
granted at the discretion of the governor should carry little or no weight in
such a proceeding.
Michael F. Welch*
33 CAL. GoV. CODE §§ 11370-529.34 Roth v. State Bar, 40 Cal. 2d 307, 253 P.2d 969 (1953). Feinstein v. State Bar,
39 Cal. 2d 541, 248 P.2d 3 (1952).
35 Feinstein v. State Bar, 39 Cal. 2d 541, 555, 248 P.2d 3, 12 (1952).
a0 Compare CAL. PEN. CODE: § 4852.15 with § 4853.
* Member, Second Year Class.
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